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CLICK ON THIS LINK, BUY TWO ASPIRINS,
AND CALL ME IN THE MORNING:
A CRITIQUE OF ONLINE MEDICINE
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
W. John Thomas*
"[S]cience and snake oil may not always look all that different on the
Net. "1
When C. Everett Koop announced in 1989 that he would resign as
U.S. Surgeon General, Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis
W. Sullivan described him as "a voice of honesty, integrity, compassion
and plain good sense."'2 Dr. Koop's colleagues reported that he intended
to engage in scholarly pursuits, including writing books and speaking. 3
Instead, Dr. Koop apparently focused his efforts on conquering the
new medical frontier in cyberspace. In 1998, Dr. Koop became chairman
and a shareholder in DrKoop.com. 4 At the outset, the company's pro-
spectus announced a goal to "establish the DrKoop.com brand so that
consumers associate the trustworthiness and credibility of Dr. C. Everett
Koop with out company." '5
DrKoop.com soon became the Internet's most successful medical
site.6 The site offers 80,000 electronic pages that reproduce recent health
care news headlines and offer information on a variety of medical condi-
tions including asthma, HIV/AIDS, cancer, depression, heart disease, and
* Lecturer, Yale School of Medicine, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health,
Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. J.D., 1982, University of Arizona,
LL.M., 1988, M.P.H., 1996, Yale University. I thank attendees of the ABA 2000 annual con-
ference, the Connecticut Bar Association Health Law Section, and members of the Quinnipiac
law faculty for comments on earlier drafts.
I Sheryl Gay Stolberg, From M.D. to LP.O., Chasing Virtual Fortunes, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1999 (quoting Dr. George D. Lundberg while editor of the Journal of the American
Medical Association).
2 Headliners: Changing a View, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, § 4 (Week in Review Desk),
at 9.
3 Id.
4 See DrKoop, at http://www.drkoop.com.
5 Holcomb B. Noble, Hailed as a Surgeon General, Koop Is Faulted on Web Ethics,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at Al, A20 (quoting DrKoop's prospectus).
6 See Bob Cook, AMA, Specialty Societies May Collaborate on Internet Site, 42 AM.
MED. NEWS, Oct. 4, 1999, at 1 (indicating that DrKoop.com attracted more than twice as much
Internet traffic as its nearest medical site competitor during May and August 1999).
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mental health. 7 The site also offers a weekly "word from Dr. Koop," in
which he proffers advice on conditions from flatulence to migraines.
Dr. Koop has indeed conquered cyberspace. In February 1999, less
than a year after it went online, the site recorded over 369,000 visitors. 8
In May 1999, the site received over two million hits, 9 and in August
1999 the site witnessed nearly 3.5 million hits. 10 In comparison,
aolhealth.com, the second most visited site, received 1.5 million hits in
August 1999, less than half of DrKoop.com's traffic."I Other cyberspace
health leaders also operate in DrKoop.com's shadow. For example, in
the same month, onhealth.com received 1.4 million hits and webmd.com
received 1.2 million. 12
Koop has emphasized that he did not enter cyberspace for financial
gain: "I didn't go into DrKoop.com to make money. I did it to change
the way that medicine is practiced, to bring important information to pa-
tients faster and get them more involved in decisions about their
health."13
Nevertheless, cyberspace proved profitable for Dr. Koop, at least for
a while. As chairman of the site, Dr. Koop receives a modest annual
salary of $135,000 and his stock holdings in the site were worth more
than $47 million in September of 1999.14
A number of ingredients in DrKoop.com's financial stew, including
Dr. Koop's sources of revenue, have drawn criticism. For example, like
most other websites, DrKoop.com features paid advertising.
DrKoop.com runs ads for cyber-pharmacies, insurance companies,
weight loss products, Internet servers, vitamins, and a "lifestyle" website
devoted to improving one's "mental health."' 5 DrKoop.com's initial
public offering prospectus disclosed that in return for this advertising, the
site would receive 2% of revenues "derived from sales of our current
products and up to .4% of our revenues derived from sales of new prod-
ucts."'1 6 However, DrKoop.com did not otherwise disclose this commis-
sion arrangement to the public.
DrKoop.com also features a "Community Partners Program," a list
of hospitals and health centers that the site touts as "the most innovative
7 See Noble, supra note 5, at A20.
8 AM. MED. NEws, supra note 6, at 1.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Noble, supra note 5, at A20.
14 Id. The value of Dr. Koop's holdings, like the value of many dot-coms, has since
dropped dramatically.
15 DrKoop, supra note 4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2000).
16 Noble, supra note 5. DrKoop officials said that Dr. Koop's contract has since been
changed to eliminate the provision. Id.
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and advanced health care institutions across the country."' 7 What is un-
known to visitors of the site, however, is that each of the 14 listed hospi-
tals had paid a fee of $40,000 to be included on the list.18
The site also seeks to match visiting consumers to clinical trials that
address the consumer's ailments. 19 The site originally referred consum-
ers to Quintiles Transnational Corporation, a newly formed company that
manages clinical trials for pharmaceutical companies. Quintiles declared
itself on DrKoop.com to be "the world's leading clinical organization. 20
DrKoop.com failed, however, to reveal that it would receive 2% of any
fees that Quintiles received for study subjects Quintiles enrolled through
the site.2 1
When faced with inquiries from ethicists and reporters,
DrKoop.com quickly renounced the commissions on advertised products
and services and on clinical trial referrals. In addition, the site also
downgraded the description of the "community partners" from "the most
innovative and advanced" to "prominent" health care institutions, and
further noted that the institutions had paid a fee to be listed.22
The resulting loss of "commission-based" revenues may have
played a role in DrKoop.com's financial demise. In April 2000, the ac-
counting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers announced that DrKoop.com had
"sustained losses and negative cash flow from operations since its incep-
tion" and questioned its "ability to continue as a going entity." 23
In addition to these financial losses, Dr. Koop may have tainted his
professional reputation. Critics have assailed Dr. Koop for compromis-
ing his ethics when he entered into these financial arrangements. Moreo-
ver, they have questioned whether he would lose credibility with the
public. 24 Dr. Koop, who in 1991 described himself as "America's family
doctor, '25 however, has expressed no doubt that his reputation will
emerge from ethical controversy unscathed: "I have never been bought. I
17 DrKoop.com, supra note 4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2000).
18 Noble, supra note 5.
19 A clinical trial is "[any investigation in human subjects intended to determine the
clinical pharmacological, pharmacokinetic, and/or other pharmacodynamic effects of an inves-
tigational agent, and/or to identify any adverse reactions to an investigational agent to assess
the agent's safety and efficacy." CenterWatch, at http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/
glossary.html.
20 Noble, supra note 5, at A20.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Bernhard Warner & Miguel Helft, Portals Start to Feel the Heat, INDUSTRY STAN-
DARD, May 1, 2000, at 63. In April 2000, DrKoop.com's auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
expressed serious doubts about the company's ability to survive as a going concern. See, e.g.,
Karen Kaplan, Pay-Per-Click Concept Gets GoTo.corn Farther, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at
CI; E-Health: Financial Future Grim for Drkoop.com, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, Apr. 3, 2000.
24 See Noble, supra note 5.
25 Id.
20011
306 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [yol. 10:303
cannot be bought. I am an icon, and I have a reputation for honesty and
integrity .... *26
This article examines the ethical consequences of the economic re-
lationships that the Internet has created in the medical industry. Part I
provides a background to online medicine by describing the Internet
medical sites and the consumer traffic the sites attract. Part II analyzes
the various economic relationships that the Internet has fostered. Part III
assesses the ethical consequences of these relationships and proposes a
regulatory solution.
I. ONLINE MEDICINE: THE CYBERSPACE LANDSCAPE
A. THE TRAFFIC
A marketing research firm recently estimated that 43% of all In-
ternet surfers access health care information online each year.27 Last
year, more than 22 million people visited online health sites. 28 Further-
more, that figure is growing by 70% each year.29 Some of this traffic has
generated online pharmacy sales. Industry analysts recently estimated
that the Internet pharmacy market will account for between 1 and 2% of
the total pharmacy market in 2001.30 By 2001, annual sales are expected
to total between $1.4 billion and $2.8 billion.3l By 2005, annual sales
are expected to reach $6 billion. 32
B. THE SITES
1. On-Line Pharmacies
In January 1999, the Internet hosted fewer than 30 online pharma-
cies. 33 By July 30, 1999, more than 400 had appeared. 34 One hundred
eighty-three of these 400 sites were devoted exclusively to prescribing
and selling Viagra. 35 Moreover, as of July 1999, 150 of these sites had
26 Id. at A20.
27 E-Drugs: Who Regulates Internet Pharmacies?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. 7, 12 (2000) (testimony of Jane E. Hen-
ney, FDA Commissioner).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 143 DRUG Topics 8, Nov. 15, 1999.
31 Id.
32 The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1999).
33 Drugstores on the Net: The Benefits and Risks of On-Line Pharmacies: Hearing
before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Commerce,
106th Cong. 246 (1999) (testimony of Carmen A. Catizone, Executive Director, National As-
sociation of Boards of Pharmacy).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 247.
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been identified as to the registrant state of origin.36 One fifth of the sites
were registered outside the United States. 37
The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) believes
some sites are legal: "[some cyber-pharmacies] offer prescription medi-
cations in states where licensed or allowed by law, and when an original
written prescription is provided or a verbal order, faxed prescription, or
approved electronic prescription is obtained directly from the legally au-
thorized prescriber with a valid patient prescriber-relationship. ' 38 Illegal
sites, on the other hand, offer prescriptions based on answers to online
questionnaires. These sites represent that a physician has reviewed the
questionnaires before he or she prescribed drugs.39 However, investiga-
tors have discovered that some of these sites merely "pirate" the names
of physicians who are not involved with the sites.
2. Professional Sites
The Internet hosts a variety of professional medical sites. These
sites, such as the AMA's ama-assn.org, 40 the American Psychological
Association's apa.org, 41 and the American Psychiatric Association's
psych.org, 42 offer information on professional standards, professional or-
ganizations, and publications. With the notable exception of linking to
their own publishing arms, the professional sites rarely provide links to
sites that attempt to sell products or services to consumers.
3. General Consumer Sites
General consumer sites, however, frequently link to sites that
attempt to sell products and services to consumers. Indeed, as one
financial analyst recently observed, sites such as DrKoop.com, 43
healthcentral.com, 44 webmd.com, 45 aolhealth.com, 46 onhealth.com, 47
healtheon.com, 48 and discoveryhealth.com, 49 premise their financial fu-
tures on just such links:
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 E-Drugs: Who Regulates Internet Pharmacies?: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. 34 (2000) (testimony of Carmen A.
Catizone, Executive Director/Secretary National Association of Boards of Pharmacy).
39 See id.
40 American Medical Association, at http://www.ama-assn.org.
41 American Psychological Association, at http://www.apa.org.
42 American Psychiatric Association, at http://www.psych.org.
43 DrKoop.com, supra note 4.
44 Healthcentral, at http://www.healthcentral.com.
45 WebMD, at http://www.webmd.com.
46 AOL Health Web Channel, at http://www.aol.con/webcenters/health.
47 OnHealth, at http://www.onhealth.com (site no longer exists).
48 Healtheon, at http://www.healtheon.com (site no longer exists).
49 Discovery Health, at http://health.discovery.com.
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[I]t's far better to draw 10,000 smokers who want infor-
mation about how to give up their addiction and tie that
information to a patch from an advertiser than it is for
them to attract "100,000 users who don't have any
chronic diseases coming in from a sports Web site." 50
Apparently recognizing the financial benefits of advertising links,
the AMA recently joined with the American Academy of Ophthalmol-
ogy, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Al-
lergy, Asthma, and Immunology, the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American
Society of Plastic Surgeons to form Medem.com. 51 Although still in its
formative stage, Medem.com promises to offer consumers "medical
shopping" in the future: "Consumers/patients will be provided the oppor-
tunity to easily access and purchase various medical and pharmaceutical
products, including books and educational materials created by partici-
pating medical societies and other products made available through vari-
ous partnerships established with e-commerce vendors. 52
4. Condition-Specific Sites
The Internet also offers a number of websites devoted to specific
health conditions. Epotec.com, for example, claims that it "taps the
speed and efficiency of the Internet, building a powerful, cost-effective
way of providing behavioral health services." 53 This site offers services
such as "private coaching from licensed professionals" which will enable
patients to "[g]et information quickly and easily," which will be
"[p]rivate and completely anonymous," will feature "no cost [if spon-
sored by an employer], no hassle, no waiting" service, and will be
"[alvailable 24-hours a day, 7 days a week."'54
Other "condition-specific" sites offer sex-response enhancement.
Menshealthonline, for example, offers: "Order your Sustain® Libido
formula for men now, with this online order form. We will process your
orders as quickly as possible. Please provide the following information
50 Tyler Chin & Bonnie Booth, Can Medem be Profitable and Ethical?, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_99/
orl2115.htm (partially quoting financial analyst Stephen DeNelsky commenting on
Medem.com).
51 Medem, at http://www.medem.com; Medical Societies, at http://www.medem.coml
corporate/corporate.societies founding.cfm (listing Medem's seven founding medical
societies).
52 Id. (last visited Apr. 13, 2000).
53 Epotec, at http://www.epotec.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2000).
54 Id.
ONLINE MEDICINE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
as completely and accurately as possible. ' 55 The "patient" need only fill
in his address and supply a credit card number to receive the product.
Of course, Viagra has been most controversial on the Internet. Sites
such as medicalcenter.net offer "an online consultation for a Viagra pre-
scription." The site promises that "[y]our medical history and patient
profile will be reviewed by a Licensed Physician. If approved for a
Viagra prescription, we will have your Viagra shipped to you." '56
II. THE MONEY
The Internet has facilitated consumer access to health information
and health products. That access has also enabled sellers to track con-
sumer behaviors, produced new transaction forms, and introduced new
opportunities for health-related financial investment. The result is a
whole new financial vocabulary for the health care community.
A. REFERRAL FEES, COMMISSIONS, AFFILIATE FEES, AND OTHER
KICKBACKS
DrKoop.com has not been alone in its attempt to capture referral
fees for linking visiting consumers to purveyors of health products. In-
deed, nearly every Internet website benefits from some form of referral
fee or commission arrangement with other sites.
For example, a number of the Viagra sites feature "affiliate fees."
Under an affiliate agreement, any site which sends purchasers to the
Viagra site receives a referral fee ranging from 2 to 7% of the sale. The
referrer, too, may offer compensation to upstream "linkers." The result
of this referral scheme is a complex financial network.
Individual sites may also pay for the privilege of being linked. For
example, the search site goto.com5 7 consists of a series of links grouped
by topic. Within these series, the search site lists other sites that pay fees
above sites that do not pay. For a fee of $1.01 per link, DrKoop.com was
ranked first in the medical information category. HealthAllies.com, 58 a
site which promises to link consumers with low-cost health products and
services, paid $1 per link to be ranked second. The American Heart As-
sociation, however, did not pay any fee and, as a consequence, was listed
forty-sixth. 59
55 http://www.menshealthonline.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2000) (site no longer exists).
56 Medicalcenter, at http://www.medicalcenter.net (last visited Apr. 13, 2000) (site no
longer exists).
57 GoTo.com, at http://www.goto.com.
58 HealthAllies, at http://www.healthallies.com.
59 Kaplan, supra note 23, at Cl.
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B. PROFESSIONAL FEES
Physicians and other health care professionals who dispense advice
on the Internet often charge for their services as well. As the following
example shows, these fees can prove to be quite lucrative.
Approximately two years ago, Direct Response Marketing 60 (DRM)
and Spar Pharmacy, both located in Jersey, England, began a joint ven-
ture in prescribing and selling Viagra. 61 DRM runs an Internet site that
writes prescriptions, which Star Pharmacy then fills. In their first eigh-
teen months of cooperation, the tandem generated $2.5 million in online
sales, most of which was attributable to Viagra. In May 1999, for exam-
ple, Star dispensed 3,698 Viagra pills. Twenty-four of these pills went to
Jersey residents. 62
While legitimate "brick and mortar" pharmacies typically charge
$10 or less per Viagra pill, DRM charged its customers $20 per pill.63
One explanation for this inflated price may be that consumers are willing
to pay a premium for the confidentiality that the Internet provides.
DRM has arranged a system through which to divide the Viagra
profits. DRM, the website, retains one third and the participating phar-
macy and website designer share another third, The prescribing physician
takes the remaining third, which was $200,000 in DRM's first full year
of operation. 64
C. PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Active participants are not the only individuals to profit from online
medicine. Before the conditions for technology stocks turned bearish,
investors flocked to health sites. In November of 1999, for example, the
Florida-based Nutriceuticals.com corporation, which offers a line of vita-
mins and other health products, sold 1.2 million shares at an initial offer-
ing price of $ 10 a share. As its president observed, "In Internet time,
when you're dealing with Internet space, you've got to rush to capture as
much of the market as you can."'65
60 Formerly at http://www.directmarketingresponse.com (site no longer exists).
61 See Laurie P. Cohen, Drug Maker Protests Dispensing via Internet, But Practice
Flourishes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999, at Al.
62 Id.
63 Id. at A]6. DRM founder Tom O'Brien has stated, "I thought we'd be shut down by
Pfizer." Id. In preparation for a short business life, O'Brien only entered into a short-term
lease and rented rather than purchased the computer equipment essential to conducting an
online business. Id. While still pressuring the FTC to shut down what it has characterized as
an illegal business enterprise, Pfizer has not attempted to stop DRM from gaining access to
Viagra. Id. at Al.
64 Cohen, supra note 61, at A16.
65 Business Today, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at 1E.
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Similarly, in Fall 2000 Healthcentral.com, a general health informa-
tion site, announced a plan to raise $86.3 million in an initial public
offering. The company's appeal derives from its lead public persona, Dr.
Dean Edell, who hosts the second most popular syndicated radio talk
show. Coincidentally, Edell owns 19.1% of heathcentral.com's stock. 66
Recent news, however, has not been promising for e-health care
companies. The Goldman Sachs Internet index fell 46% between March
and June 2000.67 Moreover, in July 2000, analysts estimated that sixty
out of two hundred dot-coms had less than 12 months cash on hand.68
DrKoop.com has not been immune from the dot-com woes. In
April 2000, the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers announced that
DrKoop.com had suffered "substantial ongoing losses" and expressed
"serious doubts about the company's survival as a 'going concern.' "69 In
July, the site topped USA Today's "Worst-Performing stocks of the In-
ternet 100" list with an 84.5% stock price loss since December 31,
1999. 70 In addition, DrKoop.com made the Toronto Star's "Death
Watch Top 10" list.7 '
More recently, DrKoop.com has attempted to revive itself by trim-
ming staff72 and luring new investors. 73 Nonetheless, analysts remain
convinced that the company's "prognosis is bleak."74
Meanwhile, shareholders have charged that Dr. Koop, who remains
chairman and sits on the board of directors, 75 and other executives with-
held a negative auditor's report from investors until the executives sold
their own shares. 76 The allegations stem from a February 1999 Price-
waterhouseCoopers report. Two weeks after the report's date and after
the accounting firm had sent a letter to DrKoop.com's board of directors
expressing "substantial doubt" about the company's viability, Koop and
three other board members sold substantial portions of their stock. Koop
66 Bob Cook, Celebrity Doctor Hopes His Name Will Enrich Web Site, AMA NEWS, Oct.
18, 1999, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_99/bizb 1018.htm.
67 See Fred Vogelstein, Dot-Com Gallows Humor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 10,
2000, at 41.
68 K.K. Campbell, Dot-Corn Pendulum Swings Toward Gloom, TORONTO STAR, July 6,
2000, at HI.
69 Warner & Helft, supra note 23, at 63.
70 Matt Krantz, 'The Party's Over': Sell-off Thumps Dot-Corns, USA TODAY, July 5,
2000, at 3B.
71 Campbell, supra note 68, at H3. The article forecasted that DrKoop.com, along with
the others on the list, would "run out of cash within a month or three."
72 Andrew Park, Drkoop.com Lays off42 workers, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug.
31, 2000, at CI.
73 Kathleen Ohlson, Troubled Drkoop.com Is Barely Breathing; Despite New Cash, Ana-
lysts Say Site Has a Bleak Future, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 2000, at 12.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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sold approximately 10% of his DrKoop.com stock for $914,850. 77
Shareholders allege that DrKoop.com did not reveal the audit report until
after the insider sales. 78 PricewaterhouseCoopers has since resigned as
DrKoop.com's auditor and the Securities and Exchange Commission is
currently investigating the allegations. 79
III. A RETURN TO THE PRE-STARK YEARS
Drkoop is a leading brand in what is the largest part of
the economy that people care about. We believe with the
right positioning and the right cleaning up of the com-
pany, you've got a real asset there that could be utilized
in a lot of ways.
Dr. Koop is an American icon. If you talk with anyone
in the medical profession or you speak to any doctor or
patients or consumers, everybody knows and loves Dr.
Koop. They trust him; they grew up with him. He was
the first one on television to really fight back against
smoking when no one else wanted to talk about it. He
was the first one to support AIDS research and make it a
national issue. Everyone believes in him.80
"A patient's choice can be affected when physicians steer patients to
less convenient, lower quality, or more expensive providers of health
care, just because the physicians are sharing profits with, or receiving
remuneration from, the providers." 81
The premise for DrKoop.com was simple. Consumers who knew
and trusted the name of the former Surgeon General would be drawn to a
website bearing his name. Those trusting consumers could then be
linked to product. and service vendors who would compensate
DrKoop.com for sending Internet business their way. 82 As Dr. Koop put
it in his 1991 biography, he knew that he "had gained the public's
trust."' 83 If Dr. Koop did not intend solely to capitalize financially on
77 Todd Woody, The Life and Near Death of Drkoop.com, INDUSTRY STANDARD, July
31, 2000 at 123, 139-40, available at http://www.lexis.com.
78 Id.
79 OhIson, supra note 73.
80 Ashley Dunn, Drkoop.com Chief Diagnoses Firm's Ailments, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2000, at Cl, C4 (quoting Richard Rosenblatt, CEO of DrKoop.com).
81 Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Rela-
tionships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1663 (proposed Jan. 9, 1998).
82 "The new idea was to create 'Dr. Koops Community,' a collection of chat rooms,
support groups and health information that would make money through advertising and e-
commerce." Woody, supra note 77, at 129.
83 Id. at 124.
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that trust, 84 the website's new CEO makes no bones about his new plan:
"This organization that we inherited was not focused on any one goal.
We want to refocus the company around sales." 85
Congress has enacted two sets of laws to address similar economic
relationships in the "brick and mortar" sector of health care. Both stat-
utes, the Anti-Kickback law and the Stark laws, seek to prevent physi-
cians from profiting simply by steering a patient to another provider of
health care services. Yet, that is precisely what DrKoop.com's CEO pro-
poses: "There are also a lot of partners in the health-care space who want
to use DrKoop's content and its 1.4 million registered users to create
transactions. We will benefit by getting a small piece of those
transactions. '86
The following section of this article addresses the advisability and
feasibility of applying the Anti-Kickback law and the Stark laws to In-
ternet health care.
A. SECRET REMUNERATION
1. Premises for the Stark and Anti-Kickback Laws
Congress enacted the first version of the Anti-Kickback statute in
1972. The statute prohibited anyone from soliciting, offering or receiv-
ing "any kickback or bribe in connection with" providing Medicare or
Medicaid services. 87 Congress subsequently broadened the statute's
scope to include kickbacks in all federal health care programs. 88 Con-
versely, Congress narrowed the statute by limiting its application to the
"knowing[ ] and willful[ ]" payment or receipt of kickbacks or bribes. 89
Simply put, the statute bars physicians and other health professionals
from knowingly or willfully receiving fees for referring federal health
care program patients to hospitals or other facilities.
Although the Anti-Kickback statute may have addressed some of
the more overtly illicit financial arrangements in federal health care pro-
grams, Congress remained concerned about the more covert kickback ar-
rangements. In 1988, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported
that Medicare "patients of referring physicians who owned or invested in
84 Koop has stated, "I wanted to make sure that I did not use that trust only for private
gain. Like many Americans, I was disgusted with the way retired politicians--even presi-
dents-cashed in on their celebrity status." Id.
85 Park, supra note 72.
86 Woody, supra note 77.
87 Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1977), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1977)
(Medicare) and § 1396h(b) (1977) (Medicaid).
88 Medicare-Medicaid Anti-fraud and Abuse Statutes, Pub. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175
(1977).
89 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub L. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000)).
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independent clinical laboratories received 45% more laboratory services
than all Medicare patients in general." 90 Moreover, all patients of physi-
cians who had any compensation arrangement with laboratories received
statistically more laboratory services than patients with physicians who
received no compensation. 91
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. For example, Jean
Mitchell and Elton Scott found both higher utilization rates and charges
for ambulatory surgical centers and diagnostic imaging where referring
physicians have ownership interests.92 Moreover, Bruce Hillman and his
co-researchers found that nonradiologist physicians with imaging equip-
ment in their offices use that equipment more often and charge more for
its use than nonradiologist physicians who refer patients to unaffiliated
facilities. 93 Meanwhile, Alex Swedlow found that self-referral led to
both increased costs and utilization of physical therapy, psychiatric eval-
uation, and MRI tests in California workers' compensation cases. 94
In response to the evidence of the relationship between physician
remuneration and referral, in 1989 Congress enacted the Ethics in Patient
Referral Act, 95 colloquially known as "Stark I," in reference to the legis-
lation's sponsor, representative Pete Stark of California. In 1993, Con-
gress enacted the sequel, "Stark II. '"96 Stark I prohibited self-referral to
clinical laboratories. 97 Stark II extended the self-referral ban to ten addi-
tional health services, including physical and occupational therapy ser-
vices, radiology services, and the provision of prescription drugs.98
Although the Stark laws have on occasion been criticized as being
overly broad and complex, they have in the main achieved their goal. 99
90 Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Rela-
tionships, 63 Fed. Reg., at 1661.
91 Id.
92 Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, New Evidence of the Prevalence and Scope of Physi-
cian Joint Ventures, 268 J.A.M.A. 80, 83 (1992).
93 Bruce J. Hillman, et al., Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnos-
tic Imaging in a Medicare Population, 268 J.A.M.A. 2050, 2050 (1992).
94 Alex Swedlow, et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers'
Compensation System as a Result of Self-Referral by Physicians, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1502
(1992).
95 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2239
(1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000)).
96 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000)).
97 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
98 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7b (2000).
99 See, e.g., Francis J. Serbaroli, Noose Around Self-Referrals Pulled Tighter: Congress
Steps up War on Practice, 210 N.Y.L.J. 113, at 9 (1993); Molly Tschida, Stark Raving Mad:
Beaten Down by Ambiguous Self-Referral Laws, Providers Now Face the Prospect of Harsh
Penalties, MOD. PHYSICIAN, May 1999, at 28 (quoting Stark as saying, "I hope that HCFA will
also consider and propose ways to simplify this law and its regulations.").
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Physicians no longer invest in the entities to which they refer their
patients. 100
2. Premises for Applying the Anti-Kickback and Stark Laws to
Online Medicine
Two characteristics of medical commerce facilitated the financial
arrangements that led to the enactment of the Anti-Kickback and Stark
laws. First, the arrangements could be accomplished very efficiently.
Physicians with spare office space could simply purchase and install
imaging equipment. Those physicians lacking space might rent the of-
fice down the hall. In either event, the referral would simply involve
walking the patient to the equipment. In effect, the patient was a "cap-
tured" customer.
Second, the economic arrangement could be kept secret from the
patient. Especially when the diagnostic equipment was not housed
within the physician's office, the patient would have no reason to suspect
the compensation arrangement. As a result, self-referral flourished.
The Internet is even more conducive to efficient and secretive com-
pensation arrangements. The "referral" process is accomplished with a
link. And, unlike Stark-like diagnostic referrals, the referrals involve no
capital expense. At most, the advertiser will pay the health site for the
privilege of posting an advertising banner and link. Moreover, as
DrKoop.com proved, at least until reporters began an inquiry, the ar-
rangements could easily be kept secret from site visitors.
The result is a complex and secretive referral network that dwarfs
the self-referral problem that the OIG highlighted in its 1988 study. Phy-
sician owned or sponsored websites can refer visitors, by hyperlink, to
pharmacies, pharmaceutical companies, health product sellers, hospitals,
clinics, and clinical trials. The referral may even include a recommenda-
tion, such as DrKoop.com's characterization of sponsor hospitals as "in-
novative and advanced health care institutions across the country."'' o
Furthermore, the possibility of the referral fees generated by these ar-
rangements can be used to entice investors to buy stock in the referring
site.
What makes the Internet particularly effective in this arena is its
ability to track downstream and upstream referrals. Web sites can track
and count traffic. Site one can link a visitor to site two, which can link to
site three, and so on. The ultimate seller can pay a commission or affili-
ate fee to the immediate, upstream link, and that site can pay referrers
100 See Tschida, supra note 99.
101 See DrKoop, supra note 4.
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farther upstream. The effect is a complex web of financial incentives
that stretches as far as the mouse can click.
3. Impediments to Extending Anti-Kickback and Stark Laws
There are two impediments to extending the Anti-Kickback and
Stark laws to cyberspace. The first is practical. The second involves the
relationships to which the statutes apply.
First, both sets of federal laws apply only to federal health care pro-
grams. That limitation, of course, provides the basis for asserting federal
authority over health care arrangements. Moreover, the limitation has
not significantly diminished the impact of the statutes. Medicare, Medi-
caid and other federal programs constitute a significant portion of "brick
and mortar" health care.' 0 2 In addition, physicians in the "brick and
mortar" sector have found it nearly impossible to enter into referral or
self-referral arrangements that segregate federal program and non-federal
program patients. Physicians have been unwilling to invest in laborato-
ries and other clinical services to which they can refer only their non-
federal program patients. As a result, most kick-back and self-referral
behavior has ceased in the traditional health care market. 10 3
Even if applicable in cyberspace, the Anti-Kickback and Stark laws
would not likely have the same impact as they have had in the "brick and
mortar" sector. Many of the services and products to which Internet
medical sites link customers are not the medical services contemplated
by the Anti-Kickback and Stark laws. Again, DrKoop.com provides an
example. The site provides advertiser links to nutritional and health sup-
plement vendors, book sellers, and other, sundry products 0 4 which
would not be deemed medical care under the statutes. Similarly,
Medem.com, the commercial website created by the AMA and other
physician organizations, contemplates linking visitors to a variety of
"consumer sites" offering services and products which are not provided
by health care professionals. 05
Moreover, many Internet health care sites cater to consumers who
pay out-of-pocket for the services and products they purchase. For ex-
ample, many Viagra vendors require purchasers to tender a credit card
102 HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, NATIONAL HEALTH Ex-
PENDITURES AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION AND AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE, BY
SOURCE OF FUNDS: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1970-2007, figure 7.1 (1996) at http://
www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-proj/tables/tOl.htm (reporting that the federal government supplies
34% of the financing for health care).
103 See Tschida, supra note 99.
104 See DrKoop.com, supra note 4.
105 See Medem, supra note 51.
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number to purchase Viagra on the Internet.10 6 Thus, the statutory limita-
tion that makes the statute applicable only to federal health care pro-
grams acts to exclude on-line credit card purchases from the statute's
coverage. Ultimately, federal programs do not have as significant a role
in Internet medicine referral fees and kickbacks.
A second, and more significant limitation precludes the Stark laws
from applying even to purchases through federal programs of conven-
tional medical services and products. Stark I and II apply to physicians'
referrals of their patients.10 7 Regardless of the definition of physician/
patient relationship one employs, 10 8 it is doubtful that many, if any, of
the millions who visit DrKoop.com' 0 9 or healthcentral.com" ° are pa-
tients of Drs. Koop or Edell.
In effect, these good doctors have lent their names to the creation of
a health care system that delivers its goods and services in the absence of
either a physician/patient relationship or federal regulation.
B. A BAN ON AFFILIATE FEES, COMMISSIONS, AND THE LIKE
1. The Proposal
The Stark and Anti-Kickback laws are premised on the philosophy
that money corrupts. Simply put, physicians' decisions about their pa-
tients' medical needs vary with the physicians' capabilities and equip-
ment. If physicians own x-ray machines, their patients are more likely to
receive x-rays.
Although there are no broad Internet studies that mirror the OIG's
investigation of self-referral, the anecdotal evidence is clear. There is no
motivation other than for compensation for DrKoop.com to tout the
standing of the "innovative and advanced health care institutions" to
which it referred consumers. The site offered no testimonials, quality
reviews, or association certifications to corroborate the description.
Neither did it offer information to support the claim that the start-up
clinical trials manager also listed on the site was "the world's leading
clinical organization."'
106 See, e.g., http://www.phentermine.net; http://www.directmarketingresponse.com.
Consider also the many other Viagra-selling sites that a search on GoTo.com yields.
107 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000) (limiting certain physician referrals).
108 See, e.g., Barbara Tyler, Cyberdoctors: the Virtual Housecall - the Actual Practice of
Medicine on the Internet is Here; Is it a Telemedical Accident Waiting to Happen?, 31 IND. L.
REV. 259, 265 (1998). The author suggests that "no touch" physician/patient relationships
may exist when the patient seeks the physician's individual advice. See id. The millions of
patients who "surf' through drkoop.com and other siteseach month do not seek or receive Dr.
Koop's individual advice.
109 DrKoop.com, supra note 4.
1 10 Healthcentral, supra note 44.
111 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Of course, once challenged, DrKoop.com either renounced financial
ties or disclosed its financial arrangements to consumers. But, as Con-
gress apparently concluded in enacting the Stark laws, disclosure, alone,
will not address the problem. Unless patients affirmatively act to refuse
the advice of their physicians, disclosure will not change the referral pat-
tern. Indeed, DrKoop.com was founded on the theory that "consumers
[would] associate the trustworthiness and credibility of Dr. C. Everett
Koop with our company,"' 1 2 and, presumably, the services and products
it touted.
Just as self-referral led to questionable treatment decisions, so has
the Internet compensation scheme led to questionable links. And, given
the amount of health-related Internet traffic, the current financial web
surely does not serve the public health.
The solution to this lack of attention to the public health mirrors the
Stark laws. Like DrKoop.com, websites affiliate with physicians to gain
credibility for their health care recommendations. But, the financial ar-
rangements made with the sites threaten to corrupt physicians' judgment.
To avoid this corruption, Congress should bar physicians from receiving
affiliate fees or commission payments for providing links to medical-
related sites on the Internet.
For purposes of simplicity and consistency, the ban would apply
only to those sites offering the services addressed in the Stark laws:
clinical laboratories, physical and occupational therapy services, radiol-
ogy services, and the provision of prescription drugs. 13 The last, which
would encompass cyberpharmacies, would address the largest financial
issue presented by online medicine. 114
Penalties should also mirror those provided in the Stark laws. The
Stark laws provide a civil penalty of up to $15,000 for each referral that
violates the statutes.' 15 In addition, physicians and others that "enter into
a circumvention scheme that the physician or entity knows or should
know has a principal purpose of assuring referrals" which violate the
Stark laws may be assessed civil penalties of up to $ 100,000.116 Finally,
providers who fail to comply with the laws' reporting requirements are
subject to a civil penalty of a maximum of $10,000 for each day of non-
compliance. "17
Application in cyberspace of the reporting requirements might be
particularly beneficial. The statute requires that covered entities "shall
112 Noble, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 87-89, 95-98 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 30-32 (predicting that by 2001, annual sales will total between $1.4
billion to $2.8 billion and that by 2005, annual sales will reach $6 billion).
115 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(3) (2000).
116 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(4) (2000).
117 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(f)(l)-(2), (g)(5) (2000).
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provide the Secretary [of HHS] with the information concerning the en-
tity's ownership, investment, and compensation arrangements, includ-
ing . . . the covered items and services provided by the entity, and
[identification] of all physicians with an ownership or investment inter-
est ... or with a compensation arrangement ... in the entity."'1 18
Application of the reporting requirements in cyberspace would as-
sist regulators in detecting the payment of affiliate fees, referral fees, and
product kickbacks from websites to physicians. Websites that enlist phy-
sicians to provide advice to visiting consumers would be forced to dis-
close details of the physicians' compensation packages to the Secretary
of HHS. Admittedly, the attendant administrative burden has proven
controversial in the world of brick-and-mortar medicine.'1 19 That burden,
however, should be less problematic in cyberspace. Health-related web-
sites, unlike brick-and-mortar practices, can operate without physician
participation. Thus, those wishing to avoid the burden may do so by of-
fering information services, links, and products and services without at-
taching a physician's name or reputation to the operation of the website.
Presumably, then, consumers seeking a physician's advice about appro-
priate provider/manufacturer choices could consult their personal
physicians.
2. The Case for Federal Regulation
States, too, could attempt to regulate online medicine. Indeed,
many have begun to assert jurisdictional authority over online pharma-
ceutical prescription. 120 Any extensive attempt by states to regulate on-
line medicine, however, faces two difficulties.
The first is a matter of pragmatic difficulty. Were each state to act
independently, online physicians would face fifty different variants of
regulation. Any effort to develop a cohesive and consistent policy re-
garding physician cyberspace financial relationships would likely prove
futile. Moreover, physicians would have great difficulty complying with
a multitude of state approaches.
The second, and, perhaps more formidable difficulty is embodied in
the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The
Commerce Clause provides that "the Congress shall have Power ... To
regulate Commerce . . .among the several States .... ,"121 As the Su-
118 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(f) (2000).
119 For criticism of the administrative burden which attends the Stark laws' reporting
requirement, see Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, Note, The Stark Laws: Conquering Physician Con-
flicts ofInterest?, 87 GEO. L.J. 499 (1998).
120 See, e.g., Joan R. Rose, Are Doctors Who Affiliate with Internet Pharmacies Asking
for Trouble?, 77 MED. ECON. 33 (2000); Amy Lane, Task Force Asks Comment on Regulating
Internet Pharmacy Services, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Sept. 11, 2000, at 49.
121 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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preme Court recognized in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,122 the "dor-
mant" attribute of the Clause limits the ability of states to impede the
flow of interstate commerce: "the negative or dormant implication of the
Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates
against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedes free
private trade in the national marketplace."' 123
In American Libraries Association v. Pataki,124 Judge Preska of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
cently applied the "undue burden" component of dormant commerce
clause theory to grant a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
a New York state "Internet Decency" statute. 125 At the outset of her
decision, Judge Preska observed: "The borderless world of the Internet
raises profound questions concerning the relationship among the several
states and the relationship of the federal government to each state, ques-
tions that go to the heart of 'our federalism.' "126
That "borderless" nature makes any state attempt to regulate the In-
ternet per se violative of the dormant commerce clause:
New York has deliberately imposed its legislation on the
Internet and, by doing so, projected its law into other
states whose citizens use the Net .... This encroachment
upon the authority which the Constitution specifically
confers upon the federal government and upon the sover-
eignty of New York's sister states is per se violative of
the Commerce Clause. 127
Similarly, any state attempt to regulate physician Internet financial
arrangements would necessarily impact physicians in other states. Thus,
under the rationale of American Libraries v. Pataki, the attempt would be
barred by the dormant commerce clause power.
Not all Commerce Clause scholars would take such a broad view of
the dormant Commerce Clause power. Justice Scalia, for example, has
argued that negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence implicates courts
in improper prospective decisionmaking which is incompatible with the
judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall
be. "Weighing the governmental interests of a State against the needs of
122 See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
123 Id. at 287 (citations omitted) (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437
(1980)). For a general discussion of the "Dormant Commerce Clause," see Lawrence H.
Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5 (2d ed. 1988).
124 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
125 Id. at 184. The court declined to reach a First Amendment challenge to the same
statute. Id. at 183.
126 Id. at 168, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
127 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, supra note 124, at 177.
ONLINE MEDICINE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
interstate commerce is ...a task squarely within the responsibility of
Congress .... 1128
Regardless of the outcome of the dormant Commerce Clause de-
bate, at this time the doctrine presents a significant question about the
validity of state attempts to regulate online medicine. Moreover, the
practical difficulties inherent in state regulation are undeniable. Thus,
effective regulation will require federal participation.
CONCLUSION
"As I came to the end of my surgeon general years, I felt that I had
gained the public's trust and that I should do something with it."129
Despite its financial woes, DrKoop.com continues to attract health
care consumers. In August 2000, the website ranked seventh on the "PC
Data Online Top 10 Hit Lists," garnering over six hundred thousand hits
by "unique individuals" in a single week and obtaining nearly 1% of the
Internet "health and family" traffic. 130 By contrast, the National Insti-
tutes of Health ranked tenth, with four hundred fifty two thousand hits. 31
Dr. Koop has profited from the public's trust in him. Perhaps Dr.
Koop harbored some altruistic goals at the foundation of DrKoop.com,
but he consented to the formation of a company premised on the goal of
"establish[ing] the DrKoop.com brand so that consumers associate the
trustworthiness and credibility of Dr. C. Everett Koop with our com-
pany. ' 132 Moreover, he recently assented to new management bent on
the single goal of generating sales by capitalizing on consumers' views
of Dr. Koop as an.icon of medical integrity.133
Dr. Koop, of course, although possessing the most recognizable
name, is not the only physician to profit from the cyberspace referral
web. Dr. Dean Edell, for example, has done well by healthcen-
tral.com. 134 And the "cyberdocs" associated with cyberdocs.com not
only "are always in," but appear to have prospered, as well. 135
The issue has not gone unrecognized by professional organizations.
The AMA ethics rules, for example, provide that "payment by or to a
128 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 895-98 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
129 Woody, supra note 77.
130 See Dunn, supra note 80. Presumably, the "unique individuals" measure does not
count multiple visits by a single individual.
131 Id.
132 Noble, supra note 5, at A20.
133 See Park, supra note 72.
134 Healthcentral, supra note 44.
135 At $50 to $100 a session, the site has been scheduling 3,000 online visits each day.
Marissa Melton, Online Diagnoses: Finding More Than a Doc-in-the-Box, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., June 21, 1999, at 61.
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physician solely for the referral of a patient is fee-splitting and is unethi-
cal."' 136 But, the AMA's rule is as ineffective in cyberspace as are the
Stark laws. It is ineffective because physicians prosper by referring con-
sumers who often are not their patients.
Moreover, the Stark laws target a problem that exists, at least in
cyberspace, even in the absence of a physician/patient relationship. As
DrKoop.com demonstrated in listing hospitals and clinical trial organiza-
tions as "leaders" in exchange for a fee, money can corrupt judgment.
When consumers rely on website judgments because the sites are affili-
ated with a well-known physician, following those judgments may not
best serve the consumers' health. Furthermore, the AMA's ethical pre-
mise has not discouraged the likes of Dr. Koop from profiting from the
selling of services and products to consumers who place their trust in the
physicians' implicit endorsements of links on their sites.
Of course, online medicine is not all bad. "Online medicine can
mean high-quality advice, affordable drugs and more control over your
own records."' 37 It is problematic, however, when money corrupts pro-
fessional judgment.
Applying the Stark laws to cyberspace will address the problematic
attributes of online medicine while allowing the beneficial aspects to
continue to exist. Websites can continue to offer information and link
consumers with useful products and services, yet, physicians will not be
able to profit from this linkage. Moreover, physicians may offer services
and advice online, even for a fee, but may not refer for a "kickback" or
receive any sort of referral fee or affiliate fee.
As one commentator recently stated, "Online medicine can mean
high-quality advice, affordable drugs and more control over your own
records. But, as with most things in cyberspace, what you see is not
always what you get."' 38
Applying the Stark laws in cyberspace will at least increase the like-
lihood that consumers get what they see. And then, perhaps, Net surfers
will be able to distinguish "science and snake oil."' 139
136 Noble, supra note 5, at A20.
137 See Claudia Kalb & Deborah Branscum, Doctors Go Dot. Corn?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16,
1999, at 65.
138 Id.
139 Stolberg, supra note 1.
